Public spending, prívate investment, and growth in O.E.C.D. countries: an empirical investigation by Argimon Maza, Isabel et al.
P.S.P.l/10-2-96 
I I I 
ENCUENTRO DE 
ECONOMIA 
PUBLICA 
Departamento de Teoría Económica y Economía Política 
Universidad de Sevilla 
Sevilla 9, 10 de febrero de 1995 
PONENCIA 
Public spending, prívate investment, and growth in O.E.C.D. countries: 
an empirical investigation. 
Isabel ARGIMON MAZA 
Banco de España 
José Manuel GONZÁLEZ-PÁRAMO 
Banco de España. Departamento de Hacienda Pública Universidad Complutense 
José María ROLDAN 
European Monetary Institute 
Summary: 
This paper is concerned with the empirical relationship between government spending 
and prívate investment. A panel of 14 OECD countries is used. We present evidence which 
suggests the existence of a significant crowding-in effect of prívate investment by public 
investment, through the positive impact of infrastructure on prívate investment productivity. 
Moreover, government consumption appears to crowd out prívate investment. The implications 
of these resulte are of foremost importance when it comes to fiscal consolidation. Déficit 
reductions engineered through cute in public investment could severely impinge upon prívate 
capital accumulation and growth prospecte. 
Resumen: 
Este trabajo analiza la relación empírica existente entre el gasto público y la 
inversión privada en un panel de 14 países pertenecientes a la OCDE. L a evidencia 
presentada sugiere la existencia de un significativo efecto "crowding-in" de la inversión 
pública, que opera a través de la complementariedad entre las infraestructuras y la 
inversión privada. Por otra parte, el consumo público parece ejercer un "efecto 
expulsión" de la inversión privada. L a implicaciones de estos resultados son de gran 
trascendencia en materia de consolidación fiscal. Reducciones del déficit conseguidas 
mediante recortes en la inversión pública podrían dañar severamente la acumulación de 
capital y las perspectivas de crecimiento. 
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N : F I S C A L P O L I C Y , G R O W T H , AND C R O W D I N G OUT 
In this paper we investígate the relationship between prívate investment and 
government spending. Empirical evidence is brought to bear upon two closely related 
questions which lie at the core of the debate on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
policy: 1) Is public spending productive? 2) To what extent, i f any, does government 
spending substitute for prívate investment? 
The first question has stimulated a considerable amount of research sin ce 
Rubinson (1977) and Ram (1986) found a positive empirical relationship between 
government size and GDP growth. Although this association has al so been obtained in 
more recent work (see Lin , 1994a), a number of papers have identified an inverse 
association between government spending and output growth (e.g. Grossman, 1988, 
Mallow, 1986, Peden and Bradley, 1989, and Grier and Tullock, 1989). In a careful and 
comprehensive analysis of this issue, Dowrick (1993) concludes that government size 
does not appear to have a systematic and significant effect on growth. 
This literature has been criticized on three main grounds. First, as shown by 
Hsieh and La i (1994) and Dowrick (1993), the sign of the association is quite sensitive 
to the choice of the sample of countries, the period under study, the econometric 
techniques and the existence of measurement problems. Second, as different categories 
of spending are well documented to have diverse economic effects, analyses ignoring 
this fact are not easy to interpret. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Lin (1994b), for 
example, show that spending categories that promote human or physical capital 
accumulation are positively associated with growth, while other spending items have 
negative or neutral effects. Finally, the single equation findings on the government -
size/GDP- growth link could be invalid when this relationship runs through indirect 
channels, i.e. prívate investment. 
These empirical shortcomings have a direct bearing on the second question. Since 
capital accumulation is the engine of output growth, any crowding-out effects of prívate 
investment by public spending impinge upon production expansión and welfare 
prospecte. The bulk of the empirical literature finds a significantly negative effect of 
public consumption on growth while the effects of public investment are found to be 
positive although less robust (Barro, 1991; Grier and Tullock, 1989; Easterly and 
Rebelo, 1993). To what extent can these resulte be traced to a crowding out of prívate 
investment? Aschauer (1989b) finds that the direct crowding-out effect of public 
investment is outweighed by a direct crowding-in effect associated with the role of 
public capital as a productive input and its complementante0 with prívate capital (see 
Aschauer, 1989a). The evidence gathered in Erenburg (1993), who estimates a simple 
macromodel with rational expectations, and in Erenburg and Wohar (1995), reinforces 
this conclusión, while the resulte in Bairam and Ward (1993) support the crowding-out 
hypothesis. As to the impact of government consumption, Aschauer (1989b) concludes 
that its crowding-out effect on prívate investment carries only a marginal explanatory 
power, a result that could be interpreted as an indication that public consumption is a 
cióse substitute for prívate consumption. However, recent evidence gathered by Karras 
(1994) forcefully suggeste that prívate and government consumption are best described 
as complementary (or unrelated) goods(2), a feature that reinforces the crowding-out 
effect of prívate investment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I I outlines the theoretical 
argumente behind the crowding-out hypothesis. For expositional purposes, we use a 
simple overlapping-generations model in which public and prívate capital are 
complemente, whereas public and prívate consumption are independent Section I I I 
evaluates the impact on prívate investment and prívate productivity of public spending. 
The empirical resulte obtained with a panel of 14 O E C D countries are presented and 
briefly discussed. Finally, Section I V draws the main conclusions. 
2. P R I V A T E I N V E S T M E N T AND P U B L I C E X P E N D I T U R E 
The equilibrium approach developed in Aschauer (1988) and Aschauer and 
Greenwood (1985), among others, assumes a competitive economy populated by rational, 
identical, infinitely lived individuáis. In this context, the general equilibrium relationship 
between public spending and prívate investment may be expressed in the following two 
equations: 
( 1 Public and prívate capital are "complementary" when the marginal 
productivity of the prívate capital increases as the quantity of public 
capital increases. 
(2) If public consumption increases the marginal utility of prívate 
consumption, both are said to be "complementary", and viceversa. 
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i = i(fk,ig,cg), i,>0, z2<0, z3^0 (1) 
fk = A ( U p , fu<Q.f¿& (2) 
where i is prívate spending, fk is the marginal product of capital, i g and c g are public 
investment and public consumption, respectively, k is prívate capital and kg is public 
capital. Along neoclassical lines, changes in investment -which are described by the 
partial derivatives of the above functions- are the result of intertemporal smoothing of 
consumption by prívate agents. 
Aschauefs discussion of the crowding-out issue is heiuistic, due to the 
complexity of his analytic framework. Nonetheless, his qualitative conclusions carry over 
in much simpler neoclassical models. Suppose that our economy is populated by 
overlapping generations of equal size. Each household lives for two periods. Households 
earn labour income only in the first period. Labour supply is fixed. Consumption of a 
representative household when young in time t is: 
c,1 = w, - t, - s, , (3) 
whereas consumption when oíd at time t+1 can be written as: 
<Á=í,(K+1), (4) 
where w, is the wage rate, st is savings, r t + I is the interest rate in the second period and 
t, is a tax levied on the young. The government uses tax revenues to finance public 
consumption of a public good nature -which enters household's utility function- and 
public investment -which is a productive input in prívate production. 
Suppose that the utility function of a representative agent is: 
U = hLnc¡ + (l-tyMCf + _ L [ 5 I / i c , 2 + 1 + ( 1 - 8 ) 1 ^ , (5) 
where c g is public consumption, 6 represente relative preference for prívate consumption 
and p is the rate of time preference. Maximization of (5) subject to (3) and (4) yields 
the savings function: 
st = o(w, - t), a = _ L . (6) 
For simplicity, assume that both prívate and public capital fully deprecíate in 
every period. The production function in per worker terms is: 
yt = Ai,ai¡ , a+p<l , (7) 
where i is prívate capital (and prívate investment) and i g is public capital (and public 
investment). Competition in factor markete implies: 
l4r f = C L 4 / ; % p - < ¿ (8) 
wt -(l-a)Ai?i¡ - ( l - c t y . (9) 
Capital available for production in t+1 equals savings of the young in t. This gives the 
momentary equilibrium condition: 
^ = 0(1 -a)M?i¡ ~ ot, . (10) 
This equation, together with the government budget constraint 
+ i, • CID 
define the equilibrium of the economy. 
A permanent tax-financed increase in public consumption reduces both first-
period prívate consumption and savings, and thus investment in the next period. In the 
long-run, after dropping time subscripte, we obtain: 
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di_ 
de l - o a ( l - c O ¿ / a - 1 / / 
< O , (12) 
g 
provided that the economy is not too far away ffom the golden rule (note that when r=0, 
by equation 8 the denominator in 12 reduces to l-o(l-a)) . As this crowding-out effect 
generated by public consumption is associated with the effect of taxes upon savings, a 
tax-fínanced increase in public investment must also produce a direct crowding-out 
effect of prívate investment However, public investment may have an additional effect 
prívate investment is crowded-in whenever public capital raises the productivity o f 
prívate capital. In fact, i f the initial level of public capital were well below its optimal 
(i.e. output-maximizing) level, the crowding-in effect would outweigh the negative 
influence of taxes upon savings. More generally, the steady-state effect of an increase 
in public investment upon prívate capital accumulation is: 
In the more elabórate Aschauer model this ambiguity emerges as well. The 
differences are just a matter of detail. When public and prívate capital are equally 
productive, an increase in public investment crowds out an equivalent amount of prívate 
investment, with no effects upon wealth and consumption. However, an additional 
crowding-out effect would arise i f public investment were more productive: as lifetime 
wealth increases so does consumption today. These two short-run effects could be 
compensated by the crowding-in effect which operates through an increase in prívate 
capital productivity. As to the consequences of an increase in public consumption, 
Aschauer admits the possibility that its effect could be nil. I f public consumption is a 
perfect substitute for prívate consumption or the marginal propensity to consume out of 
wealth remains constant over time for every agent, prívate investment changes would 
not be needed to smooth out consumption. None of these assumptions are made in our 
simple expositional model(3). 
( ' These models are not directly comparable. Note that we are 
assuming that public and prívate consumption are neither complementary 
ñor substitutes. On the other hand, with income accruing only in the first 
period and a fixed propensity to save, crowding out obtains even if the 
marginal propensity to consume remains constant. In such case, which 
implies r = p, prívate investment is crowded-out by [ l -a( l -p) ]"' units per 
di a [ l - P ( l - a M í ° í / " ' ] < (13) 
l-oaO-cOA --1// > 
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3. D A T A , M E T H O D O L O G Y AND E M P I R I C A L R E S U L T S 
The empirical analysis is carried out using the annual time-series-cross-section 
data from Summers and Heston (1991). Only the fourteen OECD countries with 
available data on infrastructure capital were included for the period 1979-88(4), which 
resulted in an unbalanced panel data set Data definitions are given in the Appendix. 
Our analysis of the crowding-out hypothesis is based on the estimation of the 
following pair of equations: 
+ ^ t o * * + V l n * * + 4 * ( 1 5 ) 
where subscripts t refer to time and j to country, i and i g are, respectively, prívate and 
public investment in relation to prívate productive capital stock (prívate and public 
investment rates), cg is public consumption, in relation to prívate productive capital 
stock, fk is marginal prívate capital productivity (which is proxied by the ratio of gross 
operating surplus to prívate productive capital stock), k is the stock of prívate productive 
capital and k g is infrastructure capital, so that no residential investment is involved(5). 
We would expect 2^ to be positive, and both a3 and a4 to be non-positive under the 
crowding-out hypothesis. On the other hand, given the standard assumption of 
decreasing marginal productivity, b2 is expected to be negative, and b3 positive if 
infrastructures and prívate productive capital are complemente. 
unit of additional government consumption spending. 
( 4 ) The countries and the periods are the following ones: Australia 
(1979-87), Austria (1979-87), Belgium (1979-87), Canadá (1979-88), 
Denmark (1979-88), Federal Republic of Germany (1979-88), Finland 
(1979-87), France (1979-88), Ireland (1979-87), Norway (1980-86), Spain 
(1979-86), Sweden (1979-87), United Kingdom (1979-87) and United 
States (1980-87). 
( 5 ) Unfortunately, our data do not allow private and public 
infrastructure to be separated out. It may be argued that both types of 
infrastructure should have roughly the same effects on productivity. In 
any case, this fact has to be borne in mind when interpreting the results. 
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The econometric analysis of the crowding-out issue requires the use of techniques 
well suited to deal with country heterogeneity. Let us first refer to the most rectrictive 
versión of (14) and (15). Assume that a^, = a m and b^, = bm, V j f V t: that is, the response 
of prívate investment and prívate capital productivity to the right-hand side variables 
does not change over time ñor across countries. The resulte of such a restrictive model 
are presented in column (1) of Table 1. In columns (2) to (6) we relax these restrictions 
so as to take into account the heterogeneity of the data. In column (2) we report the 
resulte of letting a, and b, change across countries while taking the remaining 
coefííciente to be the same across countries. The estimates correspond to a fíxed effects 
model with country dummies, and are therefore a within estímate. The dummy 
coefficiente are not reported. In order to choose between the most restrictive model and 
the within estimates, an F test is carried out, whose resulte are reported in the lines 
headed by F ^ . In column (3) we report the estimates of the model in first differences. 
Such an approach not only takes into account fíxed effects, which drop out when the 
model is specified in first differences, but may be regarded as a way of dealing with 
non-stationarity when this problem is presentí Column (4) reporte the resulte obtained 
from a random effects model. The main difference with the within estimator is that the 
country specific effects are now treated as random and uncorrelated with the regressors. 
A Hausman test is constructed to check for this restriction, with the resulte shown in the 
row labeled %2 in table l ^ . 
(6) This test is formulated as: 
SSRR - SSRU/(ku - kr) _ p 
S S R U / ( T _ to) ~ (te -M. (T-tu) 
where U and R stand for the unrestricted and the restricted model, 
respectively, SSR is the sum of squared residuals, k is the number of 
estimated coefficients and T is the total number of observations. 
^ The Hausman test is formulated as: 
where p w is the vector of the k within-group estimates, P G L S is the 
corresponding generalized least squares estímate of the random effects 
model, and V w and V G L S are their respective estimated variance-covariance 
matrices. Under the nuil hypothesis of no córrelation (the random effects 
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As far as the first equation is concerned, the signs of the coefficients are the 
expected ones under the different estimated models. The F test does not allow to accept 
the restricted model to be accepted when the alternative includes country-fixed effects 
and, on the other hand, the random effects model cannot be rejected when the alternative 
is the country-fixed effects model. Therefore, the resulte in columns (1) and (2) can be 
disregarded as far as the first equation is concerned. The evidence in column (3) implies 
a negative impact of both public consumption and investment on prívate investment, 
although only the public consumption coefficient is statistically signifícant When the 
resulte in column (4) are analyzed, it appears that the impact of public investment on 
prívate investment is negative, but not statistically signifícant The same result applies 
to public consumption. 
The lack of significance of both public sector investment and government 
consumption in the investment equation (equation 14) under the random effects model 
might arise ffom collinearity between these two variables. I f this were the case, dropping 
one variable would increase the statistical significance of the other. Columns (5) and (6) 
report the resulte of the estimation of equation (14) under a random effects model, when 
aj or a3 are restricted to zero. It should be noted that the Hausman test does not reject 
the nuil hypothesis of non-correlation between the country effects and the observable 
variables, i.e. the random effects model is not rejected by the data. While the valué of 
the coefficient of marginal prívate capital productivity is quite stable across 
specifications, the estimated coefficients for public investment and public consumption 
do not show such robustness. In fact, the new estimates seem to indícate that public 
investment has a marginally signifícant direct impact on prívate investment while public 
consumption also has a negative but small impact. Therefore, both public consumption 
and public investment appear to crowd out prívate investment although the statistical 
significance of these resulte is rather weak. Note finally that under the specifícation in 
first differences (column 3) -a valid reference in the presence of non-stationarity in the 
data- only consumption spending has a significantly negative effect on prívate 
investment. A l l in all, our evidence does not uncover any signifícant crowding-out 
model), it is the case that: 
plim ( p w - p G L S ) = 0 
N -* 00 
and H is distributed as a %2 with k degrees of freedom (excluding 
intercepts). 
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effects associated with public investment when productivity is held constant, while 
resulte on the negative effects of public consumption on prívate investment are mixed. 
With regard to the productivity equation (equation 15), it is also the case that the 
signs obtained under the four specifications are the expected ones. The constant retums 
to scale restriction was imposed after a preliminary test of its validity^. While the F 
test rejecte the restricted specification in column (1) in favour of the fíxed effects model, 
the Hausman test rejecte the nuil hypothesis of absence of correlation between the 
country effects and the regressors. Thus, the within estimates in column (2) appear to 
be the most appropriate on statistical grounds. The negative effect of prívate capital 
reflecte the decreasing marginal productivity. The resulte strongly suggest a positive 
effect of inffastructures on prívate productivity, so that it may be argued that public 
investment accumulated in the past appears to enhance productivity. The estimates in 
column (3), with the model in first differences, lead to the same conclusions, although 
the infrastructure variable becomes less signifícant. Therefore, the resulte suggest that 
there is an indirect crowding-in effect through the positive impact of public 
inffastructures on prívate productivity. 
Besides the possibility of the series not being stationary, so that the resulte in 
levéis could be a reflection of a spurious relationship, endogeneity may be present it 
would arise from the relationship between prívate investment and prívate capital, a case 
in which OLS would provide inefficient estimates. The first limitation has already been 
tackled through the estimation of both equations in first differences (column 3 in Table 
1). In order to deal with the endogeneity issue we can use instrumental variable 
techniques. The estimates of this latter specification (provided in Table A l of the 
Appendix) produce very similar qualitative resulte. Public consumption appears to have 
a significantly negative impact on prívate investment. On the other hand, the role of 
public investment is clarified: its coefficient keeps the expected negative sign but does 
not appear to be signifícant, both when public consumption and investment are jointly 
taken into account, as well as in the case where public consumption is not included in 
the regression. Thus evidence in favour of a direct crowding out associated with public 
investment is weak. With regard to the second equation, infrastructure has a positive 
When a test of this restriction was carried out, the result was that 
under the country fixed effects model it cannot be rejected. 
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impact on productivity, in line with the resulte reached when no simultaneity 
considerations were involved(9). 
4. C O N C L U S I O N S 
This paper has investigated the relationship between prívate investment and 
public spending. The paper has aimed to test the presence of prívate investment 
crowding out by current expenditure (public consumption) and capital expenditure 
(public investment), with an unbalanced panel data set for 14 industrialized countries for 
the period 1979 to 1987. 
The empirical resulte presented in the paper lend support to the existence of a 
crowding-in effect of prívate investment by public investment, through the positive 
impact of infrastructure on prívate investment productivity. Moreover, there is little or 
no evidence of direct crowding out of prívate investment by public investment when 
productivity is held constant, while there is some evidence of crowding out by public 
consumption. 
Given the data limitations, we need to be cautious about applying these resulte 
to particular instances. It is quite possible that specific types of government consumption 
may help GDP growth, and the opposite might be trae for some public investment 
projecte. On the other hand, the analysis presented in the paper does not deny that 
particular ways of funding public spending may exert their own influence upon 
investment. 
P ) As a means of testing the specification of the productivity equation, 
a direct estimation of a production function is discussed in the Appendix. 
It provides additional evidence on the technology of the countries under 
study, and on the productive role of infrastructures. The results 
presented in Table A2 of the Appendix show again that there is a 
crowding-in effect of public investment through its positive impact on 
private sector productivity. Such a result reinforces those obtained 
through the estimation of a productivity function with productivity 
proxied by the ratio of gross operating surplus to private productive 
capital. 
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A l l in all, our fíndings stress the need to distinguish carefully between current 
and capital expenditure when evaluating the impact of fiscal policy on private 
investment and output growth. From a policy view, the implications of the evidence are 
of foremost importance when it comes to fiscal consolidation. Public déficit reductions 
that rely mainly on public investment cuts could severely impinge upon private 
investment and growth prospecte. 
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A P P E N D I X 
A . D A T A S O U R C E S AND D E F I N I T I O N S 
The source of the variables is the Summers and Heston (1991) datábase PWT5. 
The periods and countries have been chosen by a data availability criteria, so that all the 
countries with data on public and private infrastructure have been included. Although 
we are interested in having a public capital variable, the Summers and Heston datábase 
does not provide a separation between public and private infrastructure. It may be 
argued that public and private infrastructure should have roughly the same effects on 
productivity. To the extent that public investment increases the stock of infrastructure 
capital, the crowding-out issue can be discussed along the lines suggested by the 
theoretical literature. 
Variable definitions: 
a) Private investment: 
i = I . RGDPW . EPRI / (Kdur . Kapw) 
b) Public investment 
i g = I . RGDPW ( 1 - IPRI) / (Kdur . Kapw) 
c) Capital productivity 
fk = (1 - a) . RGDPW / (Kdur . Kapw) 
d) Public consumption 
cg = G. RDGPW / (Kdur . Kapw) 
e) Private productive capital per capita 
k = (Kdur + Knres) . Kapw 
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f) Public and private infrastructure per capita 
k g = Kother . Kapw 
g) Production per worker 
Z = RGDPW 
l 
where all the variables are expressed at constant international prices and 
I : Total investment over GDP (1985 int prices). 
RGDPW: Real GDP per worker (1985 int prices). 
I P R I : Gross domestic private investment share in total investment 
Kdur Producer durables (% of Kapw). 
Kapw: Capital stock per worker (1985 int. prices). 
Kother: Other construction (% of Kapw). 
Knres: Nonresidential construction (% of Kapw). 
G: Public consumption share in GDP. 
a: Share of wages participation in GDP, calculated as the ratio of 
compensation of employees over GDP in every year of the sample 
(OECD data) 
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B . I N S T R U M E N T A L V A R I A B L E S E S T I M A T E S 
T A B L E A l . C R O W D I N G - O U T E F F E C T S 
I N S T R U M E N T A L V A R I A B L E E S T I M A T I O N 
(1979-88) 
(1) (2) (3) 
l i 0.80 
(4.92)*' 
0.74 
(4.68)" 
0.80 
(5.00)** 
e q ( l ) -0.07 
(0.13) 
-0.62 
(1.36) 
-1.02 
(2.28)** 
-1.05 
(2 66V* 
eq (z) 
ln(k/l) j t -0.56 
(A A<C\** 
(4.ÜO) 
1.07 
(6.29)'* 
o 
eq (1) 
eq (2) 
0.024 
0.041 
0.024 0.024 
t x j 112 112 112 
a: standard error of the regression 
The instruments used are ftaA, c,., and in equation (1) and ln (k/1),., and ln (kg/1), in 
equation (2). Country dummies where included in both equations as instruments. 
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v • :;v¿ 
r : ." i w f 
B I B L I O T E C A 
C . P R O D U C T I O N F U N C T I O N E Q U A T I O N 
The estimated equation is given by 
ln (yll) = a + (1 - a -p ) \n[kll\ + p ln[£//] 
where 
so that again the restriction of constant retums to scale has been imposed(10). The 
resulte are presented in table A2. The inclusión of a time trend, t, aiming at capturing 
technological change, resulte in the estimates shown in columns (2), (4), and (6). The 
random effects model seems to be the one that fite better the data. The positive and 
statistically signifícant sign of the infrastructure variable seems to be present in all 
models, except under column (4). However, in that case, the trend variable is not 
statistically signifícant either, so that the specification seems to be rejected by the data. 
The fact that the random effects model cannot be rejected statistically may be a 
reflection of the fact that the technological heterogeneity among the different countries 
is not directly related to the different initial states of the technology. In fact, it could be 
identical for all countries, and the individual effects could be related to other aspecto of 
the economic environment. 
Looking at columns (5) and (6) it may be concluded that, although the output 
elasticity with respect to inftastructure is smaller that the elasticity with respect to 
private capital, the resulte imply again that there is crowding in of public investment, 
through its positive impact on private productivity. This result reinforces those presented 
in Table 1. 
The tests of the hypothesis of constant retums to scale are not 
completely satisfactory, even when the within estimator is considered. 
However, given the specification of the productivity function it seems 
more reasonable to have constant returns to scale. 
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